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THE REGULARIZATION OF BUSINESS INVESTMENT
BY THE INDIVIDUAL FIRMTHE CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF INVESTMENT
MILLARD HASTAY
NAIIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
ECONOMISTS today are agreed on the central role of investment in
the working of our economy. In this they differ from their predeces-
sors not so much in the substance of their beliefs as in their approach
to a consensus. Certainly the classical school understood the con-
nection between investment and economic growth, though their
interests were such that they saw this connection chiefly as the
rationale of saving. Moreover, well before the First World War, a
number of perceptive students of economic fluctuations attempted
to delineate the role of investment in the drama of the business
cycle—notably Knut Wicksell, A. Spiethoff, Joseph Schumpeter, and
Wesley C. Mitchell. It remained for our own period, however, to
crystallize these insights into a doctrine of the preeminence of invest-
ment in an enterprise economy, and to extract from it a distinctive
slogan of economic policy—the promotion of stability and economic
growth.
For a time, however, stability threatened to become the exclusive
issue, and the implications drawn for policy favored state, as distinct
from private, initiative. Correspondingly, it seemed less important
to study the behavior and determinants of private investment than
to examine the possible ways to promote stability by public expendi-
ture. Thus, although prosperous times and the specter of new wars
have again brought the problem of growth to the fore, and with it
a new interest in private investment, our knowledge of this vital area
is but little advanced over a decade ago. To cite a single telling
illustration, comprehensive annual estimates of private investment
in manufacturing based on budget or accounting data cannot be had
for the years before 1940, and acceptable quarterly estimates on this
basis are available only for 1945 and after. For earlier years we must
have recourse to crude estimates based on commodity flows, which
require interpolation for intercensal years and adjustment from an
output basis at producers' prices to an installed basis at cost to ulti-
mate users. Anyone who has examined successive versions of such
estimates is familiar with the considerable margins of uncertainty
surrounding them. Yet for periods of time adequate for business
cycle analysis they are what we must work with, and they can be
made to tell a sensible if tentative story. In this paper, therefore,
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I bring together—chiefly in graphic form—the principal bodies of
information now available on the magnitude and course of invest-
ment, public as well as private, covering a period of years long
enough to yield insights into the behavior of investment during
business cycles.
Evidence from the National-Product Accounts
The most comprehensive view of the role of investment in our
economy is provided by the framework of statistics on gross national
product and its components. For present purposes we use Simon
Kuznets' estimates, because they cover the full span of the interwar
period, and because Kuznets has extended them forward to 1949,
chiefly on the basis of Department of Commerce estimates, and
backward to 1869, largely on the basis of William H. Shaw's esti-
mates of commodity flow at producers' prices. The two extrapola-
lions are of unequal reliability, and Kuznets himself uses the esti-
mates from 1869 to 1919 only to compute nine-year moving averages.
But while one must take care lest the wish be father to the thought,
it seems to me that those national-product components which are
closely tied to Shaw's commodity series from 1889 to 1919, for which
period they are available annually, have some claim to attention in
annual form. These are the series, presented in chart 1, which
provides a perspective on investment activities for more than half
a century.'
Though Kuznets warns us that the movement of his estimates may
be deficient in amplitude prior to 1919, the cyclical instability of
investment activities compared with consumption or national prod-
uct as a whole is unmistakable throughout the period. Consumer
commodities, however, run about three times as high as construction
and durable producer commodities combined, and despite thefr
smaller relative variations contribute more to the fluctuations in total
output than the two major components of investment goods. For
most peacetime cycles, such a finding is not inconsistent with regard-
In chart I and all succeeding charts, white areas represent periods of gen-
eral business expansion; shaded areas, periods of general business contraction.
These periods are determined from an appropriate chronology of the troughs
and peaks of successive business cycles, as identified by the National Bureau of
Economic Research. In chart 1 a calendar-year chronology is used, and expan-
sion is assumed to run from the middle of a trough year of business to the
middle of the succeeding peak year of business, with contraction following until
the middle of the next trough year. Except that a quarterly chronology is used
instead of an annual one, an exactly similar interpretation applies to charts of
quarterly data.
4Chart 1
Gross National Product and Selected Components
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ing investment as the central factor in cyclical devlopments, but it
accounts for the leverage of consumption when its pattern is sharply
altered as in wartime or its immediate aftermath. Chart 1 also con-
firms much other evidence that construction has experienced long
waves of fifteen to twenty years' duration, on which shorter business
cycles have been superimposed; but these short cycles seem to have
impressed themselves on the longer waves much more strongly
before World War I than after, while producer durables reflect
chiefly these short movements apart from a vigorous upward trend.
These contrasts must of course remain tentative in view of our
reservations about the pre-1919 data, but later findings will show
them to be credible.
A figure like chart 1 makes it clear that investment activities have
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a strong affinity for business cycles. They may in fact be the essence
of such fluctuations, and a respectable and still vital tradition of
analysis hopes to flush the essential secrets of the cyclical mechanism
on this aggregative level. It seems probable, however, that a deeper
understanding both of investment and of the cycle can be had by
looking beneath these aggregates for the different functions served,
and the different sources of initiative, in investment undertakings.
This kind of disaggregation is possible only for estimates in current
prices. The purpose of charts 2 and 3, therefore, is to serve as a
bridge from the constant-price estimates of chart 1 to the current-
price estimates of chart 4 and its successors. Their coverage is
limited to the period 1919-1949 because reliable current-price esti-
mates are not available for earlier years.
Differences between the two sections of these charts are those
Chart2 (conci)
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which might be anticipated. Because prices tend to move up and
down with the cyclical procession, the amplitude of swings in the
current-price estimates substantially exceeds that of the constant-
price series. Even so, the pattern of year-to-year changes is markedly
altered only at times of serious price inflation such as took place
after both World Wars. This fact provides a kind of general in-
surance against gross contradictions between the world of real
phenomena and its counterpart measured in cyclically unstable
prices, but we cannot rule out the possibility that important issues
may turn on the distinction between real and dollar magnitudes.
Fixed Capital Expenditures in the Large
With chart 4 we contract our attention from the whole of gross
capital formation to the part represented by fixed capital facilities,
namely, construction and durable producer goods. Special interest
attaches to these components as types of investment highly re-
sponsive to businessmen's intentions. Neither of the neglected cate-
gories of capital formation, inventory investment and net change in
claims against foreign countries, is responsive in like degree. For, on
the one hand, there is an important but as yet unmeasurable com-
ponent of unintended change in the cyclical fluctuations of inven-
tories, which makes an interpretation of the role of inventory invest-
ment in business cycles difficult and diminishes its susceptibility to
regularization; and, on the other, net change in foreign claims is so
markedly influenced by forces outside the country that itis not
closely responsive to the intentions of any identifiable agent. The
reader should note, however, that the sum of the series in chart 4 is
not conceptually identical with the sum of Kuznets' construction
and durable producer goods. The present estimates include no
expenditures for munitions, and they omit some part of government
expenditures for electric and gas utilities and for wartime equipment
used in munitions production. They also omit expenditures for
business motor vehicles except for the part used in farming and in
contract and common-carrier transportation by highway, and a
further but unknown proportion comprised in the equipment of in-
dustrial and commercial establishments. Even so they cover the
great bulk of fixed capital expenditures in all except war years, and
I believe they are tolerably representative of the four great divisions
of expenditure into which they are divided.
Primarily chart 4 stands as a challenge to those who think of all
fixed investment in terms of the business model. For the pattern of
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Chart 3
Inventory Investment
At Constant and Current Prices, 1919—1949
At 1929 Prices
business fixed investment is the peculiar product of the dominance
of business motivation. Where this dominance isclear, invest-
ment moves in virtual synchronism with business cycles; but where
it is attenuated, as in public undertakings, investment is notably
affected only by cycles of exceptional severity. To this rule, how-
ever, a qualification should be added: in the milder cycles since
World War I, public capital expenditures show an interesting
tendency to move contrary to the cyclical tides, slowing their rate
of growth or actually declining in expansion and reviving strongly
in the following contraction. Residential construction seems to stand
somewhere between; though much residential building is on invest-
ment account for either rental or resale purposes, the typical buyer
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tion to short-run changes in markets is less sharp than the business-
man's. A similar explanation covers in large degree the category of
quasi-public capital expenditures, for though privately financed, they
are chiefly concerned with urban development—schools, hospitals,
recreational facilities, churches, and so forth—and are closely keyed
to the growth of residential areas. Of course, even larger expendi-
tures for urban development are made by government agencies and
are included in the series for public outlays.
One striking feature of chart 4 can hardly have escaped notice.
This is the marked similarity between the movement of residential
building and the course of Kuznets' series on total construction
(chart 2-B). This parallelism bears witness to the unprecedented
dominance of residential building in total construction activity be-
tween the wars, and contrasts sharply with experience in the period
before World War I, when industrial building, especially by rail-
roads, was much more important and left a clearer imprint on the
cyclical course of total construction. Thus, not only does our chart
reveal the diversity of investment behavior that results from dif-
ferent sources of initiative, it helps remind us that these determinants
vary in importance with time and circumstances, of which wars
provide only the most dramatic example.
Business Fixed Capital Outlays
While business investment is the area in which purely economic
motives play a decisive role, charts 5 and 6 make it clear that even
these work themselves out against a background of circumstances
which varies from industry to industry. In manufacturing and min-
ing, which in all years absorb the largest part of business fixed
capital expenditures, we find the closest conformity of investment
outlays to the course of general business and a virtual duplication of
the peacetime movement of producer durables. Similar, though
much damped, movements appear in the capital outlays of com-
mercial and miscellaneous enterprises, which cover trade, service,
finance, communication, and transportation other than railroads
and local transit. Though these enterprises are broadly representa-
five of business at large, they include some—notably. telephones and
highway transport—which enjoyed a vigorous growth during the
interwar period that moderated the effect of business recessions on
investment activity. A contrasting case is provided by the heat, light,
and power industry, which is dominated by electric utilities. During
the twenties a phenomenal expansion in the demand for electric
:iiChart 5
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energy was accompanied by heavy and continuous outlays for
generation, transmission, and distribution facilities. The chart shows
that these reached and sustained peak levels half a decade earlier
than the capital outlays of any other industry save railroads and
local transit—two industries under heavy pressure from competitive
forms of transport. However, even the vigorous growth of electric-
power investment was not immune to short-run cyclical influences;
it merely resisted them by responding late and mildly and, except
in the thirties, promptly returning to peak levels.
The case of railroads and local transit is interesting because of
the surface similarity to heat, light, and power. But where the peak
in the early twenties is in the one case a mark of vigor, in the other
it is a sign of weakness. Ever since World War I railroads and
electric transit have been subject to increasing competition from
automotive transport, and little or no over-all expansion of facilities
took place in the interwar period. Thus from 1923 capital expendi-
tures in transportation undergo a slow decline, and exhibit a further
contrast with heat, light, and power in responding promptly to
business recession and experiencing longer declines. More recently,
however, under the pressure of war and a greatly enlarged peace-
time output, the railroads have entered on a new period of physical
expansion.
The final series reminds us that the nation's farmers are still an
important segment of the business population. As such their fixed
capital expenditures fall into the pattern of those dominated by
business influences. But farming is a unique business in that its
physical output conforms but poorly to business cycles; hence the
cyclical regularity of farm investment testifies to the marked sensi-
tivity of farm income to business cycles.
In chart 6 we profit from the enterprise of Lowell J. Chawner, who
employed the commodity flow approach to estimate fixed capital
expenditures in manufacturing as a whole and in some dozen of its
minor commodity groups.2 Only ten of the product-group estimates
cover the full period 1919-1939, and these we group into three
classes—the outlays of perishable, of semidurable, and of durable
goods industries. It might seem that this degree of disaggregation of
capital outlays is still moderate by comparison with analytical needs
2LowellJ. Chawner, "Capital Expenditures for Manufacturing Plant and
Equipment—1915 to 1940," in Dept. of Commerce, Survey of Current Business,
March 1941; and "Capital Expenditures in Selected Manufacturing Industries,"
ibid., December 1941 and May 1942.
13Chart 6
Fixed Capital Expenditures in Manufacturing, by Product Group
Current Prices,1919-1939



















































































































































































































































QCYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF INVESTMENT
—indeed, Chawner regards twoofhis groups, one being textiles and
the other stone, clay, and glass, as too miscellaneous for ready
analysis. Even so, differences in the course of capital outlays among
these manufacturing groups are as considerable as those among
major industries in chart 5. Our analysis, in fact, has reached a level
where the course of investment is only roughly explained by the
course of general business, and where special factors—historical,
technological, financial, and governmental—are often dominant in
the decision to invest or not to invest. Thus four of the commodity
groups are alike in producing durable goods; yet investment in three
of them shows characteristically large amplitudes of fluctuation,
while that in the fourth has amplitudes matching those in perishable
and semidurable goods industries. Again, output in all three of the
perishable goods industries enjoyed a generally upward movement
during the period; yet fixed capital outlays reached an absolute peak
as early as 1925 in printing and publishing, but not until near the
end of the decade in food and paper production. As a final puzzle,
of the ten manufacturing industries shown only lumber and products
experienced a declining output trend; yet not only this industry, but
also textiles, rubber and products, and leather and products—the first
two with growing, and the third with stable, output—show
ing trends of capital outlays.
As Chawner's instructive discussion of these series makes clear,
this seeming lack of order in manufacturing investment is not in-
explicable, but satisfactory explanations take the form of industry
case studies rather than routine correlations of investment with a
few standard variables such as output or industry profits. Of course,
in such case studies, output and profits play their proper roles, but
those roles are often subordinate to the development of new products
or processes (as in food and kindred products), a great geographical
shift of the industry (as in textiles), a period of serious overinvest-
ment (as in rubber and products), or the competition of new sources
of supply (as in paper and products). Generally speaking, however,
the broad movements so determined will be conditioned by short-
term cyclical influences; and investment even in the most vigorous
industries will usually be retarded, if it does not actually decline,
during recessions of general business.
The Distinction between Plant and Equipment
The distinction between producer durables and construction in
Kuznets' national-product estimates has revealed striking differences
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in their behavior, especially since 1919. Tentatively I haveidentified
these differences with the predominance of residential building in
total construction after World War I, and have argued that such
building is less influenced by short-run business considerations than
is investment in productive equipment. This argument implies that
business construction behaves much more like the output of pro-
ducer durables than does construction as a whole. Furthermore, I
have been content to discuss business fixed capital expenditures in
sum without distinguishing between plant and equipment,and this
too implies that the distinction between these business categories is
much less important than the corresponding distinction between
durable producer goods and total construction.
For all but one of the industries represented in chart 5 a tolerable
breakdown of total fixed capital expenditures between plant and
equipment is possible. These breakdowns, together with the totals,
are presented in charts 7 through 10; and 1 think it will be agreed
that the two components show generally similar movements, both
in the large and in their short-run responses to business cycles. There
Chart7
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Chart8
is a suggestion in manufacturing and mining that plant was laid
down in advance of needs in 1920-1921, but the parallelism of plant
and equipment movements is seriously distorted only by restrictions
on building during World War II and by the heavy competition of
residential building immediately thereafter. The case of heat, light,
and power presents a contrast in that plant expenditures are the
larger component of fixed capital outlays; but these expenditures,
too, follow the business rather than the residential pattern. Even in
railroads and local transit, the peculiar timing of cyclical responses
shown by total capital outlays is reflected in both components; how-
ever, the distinction between plant and equipment provides interest-
ing contrasts which we should otherwise have missed. For we
see that despite the pressure of competition, gross investment in
rails, buildings, and repair facilities—chiefly by railroads—increased
throughout the twenties, and that the decline of total capital outlays
is due wholly to a falling-off of purchases of equipment. However,
18
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the growth of plant reflects, not an increase in mileage of new track,
but the replacement of old line with heavier rails and the reduction
of grades and curves to accommodate heavier loading and faster
trains. These developments were required by the kind of new equip-
ment purchased: larger and more powerful steam locomotives and
freight cars of steadily rising capacity.
Finally, in farm outlays we find interesting evidence of a relative
neglect of farm service buildings in favor of production machines
and implements. This neglect has long been characteristic of farmers,
and such building as takes place adheres more closely to the pattern
of total construction than that of any other industrial group. Farm-
ing, however, is a special concern of public policy, and, particularly
in wartime, the expansion of farm plant has been more vigorous
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Chart10
Capital Expenditures for Plant and Equipment, Farm
Current Prices, 1919— 1949
Shaded periods are business contractions, based on NBER reference cycles.





Perhaps the most interesting breakdown of business investment
from the point of view of regularization would be by size of firm.
Such a breakdown would permit us to compare the cyclical behavior
of investment by large firms with that by small, and beyond this, to
estimate the relative importance of large concerns in the business
This section has been added in response to discussion at the Conference.
See, for example, the appended comment of B. C. Hickman on the original draft
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investment picture. But it is in this area that our information is least
satisfactory. Only for manufacturing and trade has a start been
made in compiling such data, and the evidence is tolerably repre-
sentative only for large firms. For business as a whole, we must have
recourse to a distribution, not of investment, but of net fixed capital
assets. Such a distribution can be developed for nearly the whole
corporate universe from Statistics of Income data for 1945, and this
we extend to the entire business universe on the basis of corporate
capital-receipts ratios together with gross operating receipts of the
noncorporate business population (table 1).
The procedure as it applies to unincorporated firms is crude, but
it suffices to permit a rough judgment of the importance of large
concerns in the management of the nation's stock of business fixed
property. We find that in mining and manufacturing about two
thirds of such property is controlled by large firms having total
assets of $5 million or more, that in utilities the share is substantially
larger, and that in most other industrial groups itis decidedly
smaller. For the private business community at large, the share is
about three fifths.
To pass from the holdings of business capital assets to the share
of fixed capital expenditures made by large firms, we must speculate.
We know, in the first place, that profitable, long-lived concerns are
predominant among large firms, and that these concerns can and do
invest more heavily in proportion to size than do small firms.4 It thus
seems clear that, on the average, large firms make somewhat more
than 60 per cent of business fixed capital expenditures. But small
firms might still contribute more to the fluctuations of business
investment than their average outlays suggest if the cyclical insta-
bility of their outlays were notably greater than that of large firms.
We must investigate this question before we conclude that large
firms share in investment variations to the full extent of their hold-
ings of fixed capital.
Our best approach to this question is indirect: a comparison of the
cyclical variability of manufacturing investment by large firms with
that of all manufacturing firms. We may reason that if the total is
notably less stable than the part due to large firms, then the cyclical
See, in particular, A. R. Koch's finding that a sample of eighty large manu-
facturing concerns, accounting for a quarter of all manufacturing sales and less
than a third of corporate manufacturing assets, made 40 per cent or more of
gross fixed property expenditures in manufacturing. The Financing of Large





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF INVESTMENT
instability of small-firm investment must be substantially greater
than that of large firms. For all firms we use Lowell J. ChawTler's•
series on total new capital expenditures for plant and equipment
in manufacturing. For large firms we use the National Bureau's series
on fixed property expenditures by a sample of manufacturing cor-
porations most of which have assets of $10 million or more.5 This
sample accounted for 28 per cent of all corporate manufacturing
assets in 1933 and for 43 per cent of the assets of manufacturing
corporations with total assets over $10 million. The weight of such
corporations in Chawner's series falls somewhere between a half and
a third—not so high as to dominate the behavior of both series, yet
high enough to be representative of investment by large manufac-
turing concerns. The two series are presented in chart 11, and what
we find is that the fluctuations of investment by large firms are
about as violent as the fluctuations of all manufacturing investment.
To the extent, therefore, that manufacturing provides trustworthy
evidence of the influence of firm size in other industries, it appears
that small firms contribute little more to the fluctuations of total
investment than they do to the average level of investment and
perhaps somewhat less than their share of all fixed capital assets.
Speculative as this digression has been, it is warranted by the
widespread belief that private regularization of business invest-
ment is feasible only for large firms. If this be true, the question
arises whether the area of effective private regularization does not
shrink to insignificance in the scale of investment fluctuations. Any
judgment on this question must be superficial until we know more
about the concrete measures of regularization that are feasible and
the repercussions of these measures on other areas of investment
where direct private regularization seems unpromising. But as a
first approximation one may guess that in talking about private busi-
Chawner's series appeared in his article "Capital Expenditures for Manufac-
turing Plant and Equipment—1915 to 1940," op.cit., p. 10. The National Bureau
of Economic Research series is based on a sample of fifty manufacturing cor-
porations in ten minor industry groups for the years 1915 to 1922, linked to a
sample of seventy-four manufacturing corporations in the same ten minor groups
for the years 1922 to 1940. NBER estimates of "fixed property expenditures"
differ from Chawner's estimates of "new expenditures for plant and equipment"
in that the former contain expenditures for used facilities and for such natural
resources as land, oil fields, and mines, and in that they are also net of disposals
of property. These conceptual discrepancies prevent us from subtracting the
NBER series from Chawner's to study the residual series directly, but they do
not jeopardize our basic finding about the relative amplitude of investment
fluctuations of large and small finns.
23CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF INVESTMENT
Chart11
















Shaded periods are business contractions, based on NBER reference cycles. Ratio scale
nessregularization we are at the worst discussing policies that, to
the extent they prove efficacious, are directly relevant to about three
fifths of the level and range of variation of business fixed capital
expenditures.6
The Fallibility of Annual Data
For manufacturing as a whole Chawner achieved a breakdown of
capital expenditures between plant and equipment, but I have
reserved discussion of this breakdown to the present point because
it is available in both annual and quarterly form. We are thus per-
mitted to make a direct comparison of quarterly with annual esti-
mates for an important segment of industry, and to form an impres-
sion of the losses which result from the need to use annual data
rather than estimates for shorter time periods. In general, these
losses are of two sorts: annual data understate amplitudes of cyclical
variations, and they obscure precise timing relations. At times the
loss of amplitude is so great as to obliterate cycles that would be
6Ourcriterion of size is arbitrary. If we take assets of $1 million as defining
a large corporation, the share of investment subject to the direct effects of
private regularization may be as high as two thirds.
24
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revealed in monthly or quarterly data, or so unequal as to make it
difficult to distinguish the cycles that do appear from irregular
disturbances of noncyclical origin.
In view of the hazards to which annual data are subject, I think
the basic similarities in the picture of manufacturing investment
revealed by the two sections of chart 12 are reassuring. The reduced
amplitude of the annual data is apparent; but every cycle in the
quarterly data has an unmistakable counterpart in the annual, and
no spurious or misleading movements occur in the annual series.
Moreover, the implication of annual data that cyclical turns in the
several series are synchronous with each other and with business
cycles, while something of an idealization, is a reasonable summary
of the picture provided by quarterly data. It is quite possible, of
course, for annual data to differ from quarterly with respect to the
year in which a turning point occurs; but when this tendency
appears in time series covering a wide range of economic processes,
as in the 19S2-1933 period, a similar difference may characterize
annual and quarterly reference-cycle turns. In such a case, the ques-
tion whether a particular economic process leads, lags, or moves
synchronously with business cycles may well be answered similarly
from annual and quarterly series.
A considerably more stringent comparison between annual and
quarterly data is provided in chart 13, which presents Department
of Commerce estimates of gross national product and certain of its
components. The comparison is more stringent because it relates to
a period in which the contrast between business cycles marked off in
annual and quarterly form is striking. In terms of annual data the
war contraction lasted two years; in terms of quarterly data, only
three quarters. However, this difference has its counterpart in the
time patterns of important economic variables during these years;
and making use of the appropriate reference chronology in each
case, one would draw conclusions from quarterly data which differ
in detail from those based on annual data, but would not conclude
that the picture provided by annual data had been grossly mis-
leading.
These comparisons give me some confidence that the lessons to
be drawn from the annual series on investment presented in this
paper would not be upset, though they would certainly be refined,
by corresponding time series in monthly or quarterly form.
25Chart 12
Capital Expenditures for Plant and Equipment in Manufacturing
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Shaded periods are business contractions, based on NBER reference cycles.
* Seasonally adjusted.
Summary
What, briefly, are the lessons to be drawn from these series? In the
nature of the case they must be simple, for in this paper we have
looked only at the end results of investment. But even at this level
of analysis, one can begin to put together a picture of the investment
process which differs in important respects from working impres-
sions still widely held about the subject.
1. The most striking lesson, of course, is that we must not think
of all investment in terms of the business model, or feel that we have
sufficiently refined our analysis by distinguishing government invest-
27
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Chart13
Gross National Product or Expenditure and Selected Components
Current Prices, by Years and by Quarters at Annual Rates
1939 — 1950
Annual Data Quarterly
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ment, regarded as independent of business cycles, and private
investment, regarded as determined by narrow business interests.
When the data permit us to distinguish sources of initiative, we see
at once that many points of vantage lie between these extremes and
that they are occupied by significant groups. Thus, while a portion
of public investment may be independent of business cycles, what
we find when we take all government investment together is a series
which responds less regularly to business cycles than any category
of private investment, but which nevertheless declines in severe
cycles and reacts in a distinctive way to cyclical forces in mild ones.
It is easy to forget that a good deal of government investment is
subject to the same kind of accounting scrutiny as private, and that
a government administrator may pay close attention to costs and
financial markets. That government investment behaves as uniquely
as it does bears witness to the type of function which it serves, and
to the complex mixture of political and economic factors at work in
the decision-making process. This political leavening, however, is
stronger in some undertakings than in others; and when we can
differentiate among public functions, we shall find types of govern-
ment investment that are economically indistinguishable from pri-
vate investment.
The importance of the function served by investment shows up
clearly in areas where public and private initiative overlap. What I
have called quasi-public investmentis made forfacilities the
demand for which is loosely, and in some cases perversely, related
to business cycles. Such buildings as schools, hospitals, and recrea-
tional centers depend on the growth and age-composition of local
populations, take many months to plan and finance and still more
months to complete, and when completed will serve for years or
even decades. They are not intended to satisfy short-run changes in
demand, and even when privately financed they cannot be managed
on strict business principles. To some extent these outlays will re-
spond to the current business situation because costs are important
even to the managers of endowments, but the response will be more
like that of public agencies providing comparable facilities than that
of business enterprises providing a service for profit.
One stage beyond is the vantage point of the residential investor,
who behaves more like a consumer than an entrepreneur even
though his demand is swelled by that of true entrepreneurs. In him
we meet an investing agent who is not equipped to follow the short-
run business situation, and who builds from a sense of need at times
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when his resources are adequate to permit it. Nor is he a negligible
factor in the investment total, for during the interwar period the
outlays on his behalf were second only to those of private business
enterprises. It is thus necessary to find a place for him in the invest-
ment picture, and it must differ in important respects from any we
have so far identified.
2. Our second lesson is related to the first in that it points to com-
plexities within the business investment sector. Whether we deal
with major industries or with minor industries within the manufac-
turing group, the sensitivity of investment to fluctuations in general
business is a common feature. But these general business influences
appear to dominate the course of investment only at times of severe
crisis. In other seasons more important influences can be traced to
circumstances in the history, technology, or profitability of the par-
ticular industry, or even of particular firms within the industry.
Taken over the economy as a whole the effects of many of these in-
fluences cancel out, but these effects are not individually negligible
and the cancellation can seldom be more than partial. Thus many
of these special influences leave their trace on even the broadest
aggregates. The classic case appeared in the era of railroad building,
when the peculiar vitality of the railroad industry put its mark on
investment as a whole.
3. The one industry influence which has seldom been neglected
by students of investment is fluctuations in output. When carefully
conceived, this influence is assumed to work through the rate of
change in output, with investment moving in step with this rate,
perhaps with a lag. However, the long history of attempts to con-
firm the acceleration principle yields little evidence that this factor
plays an important role in the short-run variations of investment. No
doubt over long periods one can show some average correspondence
of output and capital facilities, and future demand is clearly one of
the factors which entrepreneurs take into account in laying down
investment schedules. But this future would not be the immediate
future even if it could be accurately forecast, and ideally is some
sort of moving average of the near and remoter future. To the
extent that future demand is estimated from past sales, some con-
nection between output changes and investment may result; but
unless entrepreneurs project the immediate past much more naively
than seems likely, this connection cannot be close.
4. What, then, accounts for the almost universal imprint of busi-
ness cycles on the course of business investment? On this question
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it is impossible to hope for agreement until our evidence is much
more complete. In my judgment, however, the most cogent explana-
tion of this trait is that it reflects the timing of investment commit-
ments to take advantage of the state of markets, both for capital
goods and for products. These immediate market states do not
determine investment plans, which in fact look beyond them over
many future market states. But they do determine whether existing
plans will be executed now or postponed to a later date. When costs
are low and financing is easy, many long-deferred investment plans
are taken up for consideration; let the outlook in product markets
also turn favorable and these plans will be freely executed. On the
other hand, when costs rise and financing becomes more diffleult,
investment programs are examined much more critically; if product
markets also turn weak, even the most urgent plans will be shelved
until a more favorable season. Since these conditions appear and
evolve with business cycles, a corresponding rhythm appears in the
various lines of investment. But such factors chiefly control timing;
magnitudes have their own explanation, and must be traced to their
origins in particular firms and industries.
5. Businessmen who look at the investment process have always
been more impressed by the special influences at work than by the
common forces that weld investment plans into a nationwide system.
From what we have learned at successive steps in the disaggregation
procedure, we can see that there is an important element of truth in
this point of view. It is a proper account of what the businessman
sees from his point of vantage. But we can also appreciate that it is
an incomplete account. What appears as a secondary influence on
investment at the level of particular industries builds up an impres-
sive dominance when many industries are combined because it
affects all of them alike, whereas the special factors tend to be
offsetting. This is a fact of enormous importance from the point of
view of investment regularization. Quite probably what can be
accomplished at the level of individual firms and industries will
strike many as a frail reed on which to rest the stability of the
economy. But these minor accomplishments, taken over all firms and
all industries, may add up to a major contribution to the stability
of total investment.
Appendix: Note on Concepts andData
The concepts used in this paper are those made familiar in national-
product accounting. Thus investment in a given period is the part
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of current national output that does not pass into direct consump-
tion; and it is considered gross, i.e., without allowance for deprecia-
tion of the preexisting capital stock. In Simon Kuznets' terminology
this notion is called gross capital formation; it consists of (1) total
construction other than maintenance or repairs, (2) all acquisi-
tions of newly produced industrial equipment, including munitions,
(3) the change in inventories of business enterprises and farmers,
and (4) net change in claims against foreign countries. With some
violence to standard accounting usage, the sum of (1) and (2) is
referred to as fixed capital expenditures.
The object of the following notes is to identify the time series used
in the charts presented in this paper. For fuller details on the con-
struction and coverage of these series, the reader is referred to the
sources cited.
QiARTS 1, 2, AND3
The basic data are those covering the period 1919-1938, the funda-
mental source for which is Simon Kuznets' National Product Since
1869, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946. The same
source presents comparable estimates by overlapping decades for
the full span 1869 to 19B8. From these, decade averages centered
at five-year intervals are derived, and provide basing points for
interpolating annual movements from 1891 to 1918. These interpola-
tions will first be described, after which the extrapolations for 1989-
1949, based on Department of Commerce data, will be outlined.
The interpolation of gross national product is accomplished in two
ways. For 1909-1918, Wiliford I. King's annual estimates of national
income, adjusted to include imputed rent, are used to interpolate the
annual movement of net national product, to which is added a rough
annual series on capital consumption derived by linear interpolation
of decade estimates. For 1891-1908, the sum of W. H. Shaw's annual
estimates of total commodity flow destined for domestic consump-
tion and a newly compiled series on the annual excess of merchandise
exports over imports is used to interpolate the annual movement
of gross national product directly. For consumer commodities and
durable producer goods, 1891-1918, the interpolators are Shaw's
corresponding series on commodity flow destined for current con-
sumption; and for construction over the same period, from Shaw's
series on the output of construction materials for domestic use. All
interpolations are made in terms of 1929 prices.
The extrapolations for 1939 to 1949, in both current and 1929
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prices, employ Department of Commerce data in such a way as to
preserve continuity in the concept of national income. This problem
chiefly concerns the government sector, which in Kuznets' scheme
contributes to consumption to the extent of direct taxes and to in-
vestment to the extent of additions to stocks of all kinds in the
hands of government. Thus total consumer goods and its principal
commodity components are extrapolated by corresponding Depart-
ment of Commerce series, each adjusted to the level of Kuznets'
estimates in the overlapping years 1936-1938. The total and com-
ponents of investment are extrapolated similarly: gross domestic
capital formation, by the sum of Department of Commerce series
on gross private domestic investment and new public construction,
together with an estimated series of munitions output; construction,
by the Department of Commerce total of new private and new
public construction; inventory investment, by the corresponding
Department of Commerce series; and net change in foreign claims,
by the Department of Commerce series on net foreign investment.
All of these extrapolations are adjusted to the level of Kuznets'
estimates in the overlapping years 1936-1938. Finally, gross domestic
capital formation plus net change in foreign claims yields gross
capital formation, while the same series less construction and inven-
tory investment yields producer durables.
This brief account is necessarily silent on many technical details,
including interpolation formulas and specific source references.
Persons desiring such information are referred to two mimeographed
reports by Simon Kriznets, Annual Estimates of National Product,
1869-1949, NBER, 1951, and Nine-Year Moving Averages of Na-
tional Product and Components by of Use, 1873-1945, NBER,
1951.
CHARTS 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, AND 10
For the family of series presented in these charts, the two funda-
mental sources are (1) the Department of Commerce estimates of
new construction activity "Construction Volume and Costs, 1915-
1951, statistical supplement to Constructzon and Build2ng Materials,
May 1952, and (2) the SEC—Department of Commerce estimates of
business expenditures for new plant and equipment, 1939-1950 (see,
e.g., The Economic Report of the President, January 1952, table
B-19).
These materials are supplemented from three further sources, as
follows: (8) Farm equipment investment is measured by estimates
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of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics published in the Farm
Income Situation (see, e.g., "Farm Capital Expenditures, Deprecia-
tion, and Net Investment, 1919-1950," table 14, in FIS-131, July-
September 1951). (4) To carry business fixed capital expenditures
back to 1919 and to achieve the breakdown of these between plant
and equipment for 1919 to 1938, use is made of the Federal Reserve
Board estimates (which, indeed, underlie the SEC-Commerce esti-
mates before 1945). The relevant references here are to George
Terborgh, "Estimated Expenditures for New Durable Goods, 1919-
1938," Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 1939, pp. 73 1-736, and
addenda to the same article, Federal Reserve Bulletin, February
1940, p. 116, and February 1941,P.103; Frederick C. Dirks in the
Federal Reserve Bulletin, April 1942,pp.317-318; and D. P. Warner
and A. R. Koch in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 1946,
pp. 967-973.(5) Certain government estimates are reconstituted by
reference to published series in the American Gas Association's Gas
Facts and the American Transit Association's Transit Fact Book.
Public fixed capital expenditures consist of public nonresidential
construction expenditures in (1). Quasi-public fixed capital expendi-
tures comprise the following private construction expenditures in
(1): religious, educational, social and recreational, hospital and
institutional, miscellaneous nonresidential, and all other private.
Residential fixed capital expenditures are the sum of public and
private, farm and nonfarm residential construction in (1). Farm
business-plant expenditures consist of farm service building con-
struction in (1).
The classification of nonf arm business fixed capital expenditures
is derived as follows:
a. "Manufacturing and mining" agrees with sources 2 and 4,
except that estimates for 1935-1938 are unpublished revisions of the
compiler.
b. "Railroads and local transit" consists of railroads (sources 2 and
4) and local transit (source 4 through 1938; Transit Fact Book
thereafter).
c. "Heat, light, and power" through 1938 consists of electric utilities
(source 4), gas utilities and pipelines (Gas Facts), and petroleum
pipelines (source 1); thereafter it is identical with SEC-Commerce's
"electric and gas utilities" (source 2).
d. "Commercial and miscellaneous" is the residual. Through 1938
it consists of the FRB's "commercial and miscellaneous" and "tele-
phones" (source 4) plus Commerce's "private telegraph construc-
83CYCLICAL BEHAVIOROFINVESTMENT
tion" (source 1); after 1938 it consists of SEC-Commerce's "com-
mercial and miscellaneous" and "other transportation" (source 2)
less local transit (as in item b, above).
The breakdown between plant and equipment after 1938 is ac-
complished by estimating plant expenditures and treating the dif-
ference between total fixed capital expenditures and plant expendi-
tures as equipment investment. For manufacturing and mining, the
estimate of plant expenditures is the sum of Commerce's private
industrial construction and oil-and-gas-well drilling, raised to the
level of the FRB's plant investment in 1939-1940 (see Dirks, op.cit.,
pp. 317-318). Forrailroads and local transit, it is the total of Com-
merce's construction estimates for these two industries (source 1).
And for the heat, light, and power industries, it is the sum of Com-
merce's construction statistics for the following utilities: manu-
factured and natural gas; petroleum pipelines; and electric light
and power (except for 1939-1941, where Dirks' relative plant ex-
penditures are applied to Warner and Koch's total—see source 4,
above).
The least satisfactory of these series is the one on public invest-
ment because it fails to include public equipment expenditures. For
the period 1939-1945 Warner and Koch (op.cit., pp. 967-973) have
attempted to meet this deficiency; and for subsequent years to 1950
we have made estimates of our own of public equipment investment,
to be added to the series on public construction. Study of these
alternative series, however, does not disclose any material differences
in cyclical behavior; and because of the difficulty of combining
estimates of different conceptual content, we prefer to use public
construction as an index of total public investment throughout the
period.
CHART 6
From Lowell J. Chawner, "Capital Expenditures in Selected Manu-
facturing Industries," in Dept. of Commerce, Survey of Current
Business, December 1941 and May 1942.
CHART 11
See footnote 5 to text.
12
From Lowell J. Chawner, "Capital Expenditures for Manufacturing
Plant and Equipment—1915 to 1940," in Dept. of Commerce, Survey
of Current Business, March 1941.
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CHART 13
From Dept. of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, National
Income Number, July 1952.
COMMENT
BERTC.HICKMAN, National Bureau of Economic Research
An important lesson to be drawn from Millard Hastay's paper was
not sufficiently emphasized, either in the paper or in the discussion.
Only a small proportion of total investment could be easily regu-
larized by the action of private firms.
For example, note the importance of residential construction. In
1926, near the top of a long cycle, fixed capital expenditures in
residential construction were approximately $5.7 billion, or about
one third of total fixed capital expenditures. In 1933, near the bot-
tom of a long cycle, they stood at $500 million, or about one ninth
of the total. This category not oniy bulks large in peak years, it also
undergoes a tremendous decline in low years. Stabilization of invest-
ment in residential construction probably would require govern-
ment action. Private firms might assist by reducing the cost structure
in construction, but this would be hard to accomplish, and it is not
clear that it would promote greater stability of expenditures over
time, since costs would be reduced in both expansions and contrac-
tions. Furthermore, public and quasi-public investment together
accounted for $2.9 billion in 1926 and $1.8 billion in 1933. This again
is an area of public policy. Fixed capital expenditures in the public
and residential sectors combined are approximately equal to the
total expenditures made by business.
It is often argued that the best chances for private initiative in
this matter lie with large firms which have a continuous existence
and a range of choice in investment opportunities enabling them to
select a time pattern of outlays over a long period. If this is a valid
point, the opportunities for regularization of farm investment and
perhaps of commercial and miscellaneous investment would be
minor, since small firms are typical of these sectors. But in 1926,
farm investment was $800 million and commercial investment $3
billion. The sum of the two is nearly one half of the business total.
Small firms also account for an important part of total manu-
facturing and mining investment. Together these categories make
up a substantial proportion of investment in business plant and
equipment.